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Abstract: We model a dynamic monopoly with environmental externalities, in-
vestigating the adoption of a tax levied on the firm’s instantaneous contribution to
the accumulation of pollution. The latter process is subject to a shock, which is i.i.d.
across instants. We prove the existence of an optimal tax rate such that the monopoly
replicates the same steady state welfare level as under social planning. Yet, the corre-
sponding output level, R&D investment for environmental friendly technologies and
surplus distribution necessarily differ from the socially optimal ones.
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1 Introduction
A lively debate is currently taking place on the need to preserve the environment from the
negative consequences of pollution generated by industrial activities ? . A crucial aspect
is the lack of incentives on the part of profit-seeking firms to carry out R&D projects to
generate new environmental-friendly technologies.
To this effect, policy makers may adopt several forms of regulation and taxa-
tion/subsidization policies to induce firms to internalize externalities and invest accord-
ingly. The standard approach to this problem consists in introducing a Pigouvian tax
or subsidy rule whereby firms pay or receive an amount of money proportional to the
aggregate current stock of pollutants generated by the industry as a whole. We propose
an alternative policy design, where the tax is levied on the marginal contribution to the
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? For an exhaustive account, see [12] and [6].
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